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a. p. richardson,

Editor

EDITORIAL
The court of appeals of the state of New
York recently rendered a unanimous
decision in a case of considerable interest
to those who believe or disbelieve in the propriety of contingent
fees for professional services. The case itself was unimportant.
It was simply another instance of a personal-injury suit with
which the courts of New York and other American states are
clogged and with which the bar has recently been much concerned.
In rendering the opinion of the court Judge Pound said, in part:

Lawyers’ Liens for
Contingent Fees

“The fundamental question presented by the case is whether the plain
tiff in a personal-injury case may, under any circumstances, settle with
the defendant and release the judgment, pending an appeal by the defend
ant, in disregard of the contract of plaintiff’s attorneys for a contingent
fee of forty per cent of the amount recovered. On the trial a verdict was
rendered in favor of plaintiff for $12,500. Pending an appeal from the
judgment entered thereon, plaintiff settled the action for $2,000, of which
$800, representing their lien of forty per cent of the amount of the settle
ment, was set aside for his attorneys and tendered to them. The action
was discontinued and the judgment satisfied by the defendant therein.
“The settlement was made in good faith on notice to the attorneys with
the approval of the court, given over their objection. It is not contended
that the compensation contracted for was excessive. The plaintiff making
the settlement is financially irresponsible. The defendant is presumed
to be responsible.
“The attorneys contend that as their position is ‘The same as that of an
equitable assignee’ of the judgment (Beecher vs. Vogt Mfg. Co., 227 N. Y.
468), their lien attaches thereto for the full amount thereof and cannot be
affected by any settlement between the parties without their consent. . . .
“Does an honest settlement of an action after judgment deprive the
attorney of his lien on the judgment? Some stress is laid on the fact that
this case was, when the settlement was consummated, subject to the
vicissitudes of the pending appeal. This doubtless is an argument to
sustain the good faith and expediency of the settlement, but the basic
question is as to the client’s control after judgment in all cases. Un
questionably he may make an honest settlement of his cause of action
before judgment without regard to the wishes of his attorney. (Lee vs.
Vacuum Oil Co., 126 N. Y. 579; Peri vs. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 152 N. Y. 521;
Fischer-Hansen vs. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 173 N. Y. 492). The lien,
whether before or after judgment, is subject to the right of the client to
settle in good faith. The attorney may, however, follow the proceeds to
enforce his lien. The law does not permit the client to cheat his attorney.
But the client is competent to decide whether he will continue the litiga
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tion or seek to collect the judgment or agree with his adversary in the
way. . . .
“The rule is of universal application. It applies to settlements before
and after judgment alike. General statements that the attorney is an
equitable assignee of the judgment or that the judgment is a higher security
to which the lien attaches do not conflict with this holding. They must
be read in connection with the other general principle that honest settle
ments made in good faith because the client prefers something certain in
hand to the enforcement of his legal rights are not prohibited by the
existence of the attorney’s lien. The court has approved the settlement
in this case, pending appeal. We prefer to base our decision on the client’s
control of the judgment rather than the pendency of the appeal. It would
be hard law to say that a client would get nothing from a settlement of a
final judgment under any circumstances until he had satisfied his attor
ney’s claim thereon in full or obtained his consent to the settlement. The
question is not one of power to settle but one of the fairness of the settle
ment made.”

It will be noted that the court did not
express any opinion as to the righteous
ness of the fee or of its basis. Perhaps
the court would have approved the old argument that without the
assistance of counsel the client would never recover anything and
unless damages were recovered the client would be unable to meet
the expense of suit. On the other hand, the court might have
adopted another attitude. Accountants, who are inclined to
think in figures, will immediately be attracted by the fact that
had the appellants in the case succeeded they would have been
entitled to recover from the plaintiff the sum of $5,000, whereas
the total amount which he received from the respondent was
$2,000. This would have been a contingent fee in excelsis, and it
seems to us that if anyone still requires conclusive proof that the
principle of a fee based upon results is erroneous, this case pro
vides the needed demonstration. Not long ago word was re
ceived of a case in a neighboring state which will probably be
approved by some lawyers, but it does not seem to us that it can
possibly be justified under any code of moral right. An old man
driving a Ford car was struck by another and heavier car driven
by a careless and perhaps drunken driver. The old man suffered
two broken ribs, his jaw was shattered and serious internal in
juries developed. His car was a total loss. When he was dis
charged from hospital he endeavored to collect damages from the
guilty person, but he did not succeed. He then went to a man
who is supposed to be a reputable lawyer and asked his assistance.
The lawyer undertook to write a letter to the culprit and demand
damages. The fee was to be fifty per cent. of whatever was recov
ered. It happened that the driver of the large car was impressed
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by the letter from the lawyer and the case was finally adjusted,
without going into court, for the sum of $1,600. The lawyer
received $800, which seems to be a sufficient fee for writing a
letter. He did nothing else. The man who was injured received
barely enough to pay the hospital expenses. Is there justice in
such a case?

The members of bar associations who
have been disturbed by the prevalence
of what is commonly described as am
bulance-chasing certainly have reason to seek a remedy, but is not
the remedy at hand? If all contingent fees were inhibited we
think that the number of personal-injury suits would be so re
duced that the courts would not be embarrassed by their abun
dance. The bar of Great Britain years ago forbade the contin
gent fee and it is not quite clear why the American bar, with its
splendid traditions and common sense, should still permit an
archaic injustice. The argument which has always been used in
support of the consent to the use of the contingent fee is that it is
required for the good of the client. It is not altogether obvious
that the good of the client is the sole reason for ambulance-chas
ing. ' Accountants who believe that the contingent fee is never
justified are in the majority. Some accountants doubtless
undertake cases in which the fee is contingent upon the results,
but it is an eloquent fact that accountants never mention such an
arrangement and they are certainly ashamed of it. There has,
however, been an effort on the part of some practitioners in ac
countancy to abolish the American Institute’s rule against con
tingent fees, on the theory that there may be exceptional cases in
which such a fee is necessary and the accountant can be trusted to
act as a gentleman. No doubt most accountants can be so
trusted, but it is well that there is a rule to which reference can be
made when necessary. Perhaps it may not be unreasonable for
the accounting profession in a moment of elation to feel slightly
superior to any profession in which the contingent fee is still
tolerated.
Why Not Prevent
Injustice?

One of the departments of The Journal
of Accountancy of which those who
have the direction of the magazine in
charge are justly proud is that devoted to the problems which con
front students. For many years The Journal of Accountancy
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has contained a students’ department, and the number of letters of
commendation and gratitude which have been received from all
parts of the world indicate that the readers do greatly appreciate
the assistance which the department has given them. The
Journal has been fortunate in having secured extremely able
directors for the department. Looking back over the years
one remembers such leaders as John R. Wildman, who inaug
urated the department, Seymour Walton and H. A. Finney, all
of whom conducted the department in a way that was a distinct
credit to the accounting profession. Lately Mr. Finney ex
pressed his desire to relinquish the duties which the editorship
of the department involved and we have been compelled to
accept his resignation. Readers will have noted that in the
November Journal the department appeared under the editor
ship of H. P. Baumann. Mr. Baumann has been assisting
Mr. Finney arid his work has been of great value. We are glad
indeed to have the opportunity to place the department in Mr.
Baumann’s hands and we are confident that the traditions which
have been built up by his predecessors will be ably sustained and
carried forward by him.
There has been of late a recurrence of
interest in the question of the account
ant’s duty with reference to inventories,
and, as in the past, there seems to be an overwhelming preponder
ance of opinion to the effect that the accountant can not assume
responsibility for inventory valuation. The subject has been
discussed extensively, and there have been able proponents of
both theories, but so far we have not heard any argument which
has convinced us that the accountant may properly attempt to
express an opinion upon the value of inventory except in unusual
cases. It is possible that the auditor might be so familiar with
the details of the business under audit and the class of mer
chandise might be so restricted and easily appraised that the
auditor could assume full responsibility, but such cases are so
rare that they do not justify a general conclusion to the effect
that the accountant may assume responsibility. It has been said
that if the accountant or his staff can not place a value upon in
ventories additional expert assistance can be engaged and the
reports can be rendered to the accountant, who in turn will vouch
for them and present them to the client; but it seems much
Accountants and
Inventory Accuracy
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simpler for the client himself to engage the expert acquainted
with the principles of valuation and the concrete nature of the
business. Why should the accountant assume the burden of
responsibility for something which he does not know and can not
be expected to know himself? Take, for example, the inventory
of a chemical plant. Can anyone honestly believe that an ac
countant could verify such an inventory? He might count the
cubic contents of vats and other containers, but what those re
ceptacles contained would be entirely outside the gross and scope
of his opinion. Or does anyone really believe that an accountant
could classify and value the stock of a jeweler? Suppose, as an
illustration, that a tray of rubies were placed before the account
ant for valuation. Could he determine the difference between the
native and synthetic ruby, when only the most expert lapidary can
make such determination after test? It seems probable that the
most that the accountant could do would be to count a certain
number of red stones and regard them as rubies. They might be
nothing more than glass.
Naturally the proposal that the ac
countant should assume full responsi
bility for inventories meets with cordial
approval among bankers. They are ever ready to have respon
sibility assumed for them. If the accountant, or anyone else,
would guarantee the banker against all loss or possibility of loss,
the banker would rejoice. Why should it be limited to a mere
question of inventories? Some people say that if the accountant
can not accept the burden of valuation he may at least verify
quantities. Well, let us suppose that the accountant goes into
a loft containing thousands of bales of silk, cotton or woollen
goods. Is he to unroll each bale, measure its length and width
and distinguish between what is silk, or silk and cotton, or silk
and wool? Or again, suppose that he is called in to count the
stock which makes up the heterogeneous miscellany of a depart
ment store. He may count various items, but it is physically
impossible for him to count them accurately or all. Shall he be
expected to certify that he actually verified the physical presence
of everything from grand pianos to safety pins? Probably no one
ever took an accurate inventory of everything in a department
store, but even if the employees of the mercantile company itself
were able to make such a count the accountant certainly would
444
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not be able to do so. How, then, can the accountant certify to
the accuracy of the count? But assuming, for the sake of argu
ment, that it were possible to make such a count, what value
would it have unless the accountant could distinguish between
goods currently in demand, those obsolescent and those obsolete?
It seems to the conservative members of the profession that this
whole question of inventory verification is replete with dangers.
It is a natural characteristic of the present day, as it probably has
been of all past days, for aggressive men to attempt to broaden
their fields of activity, but history shows that it is always well
to make haste slowly when going into new territory. The ac
countant is called upon to do many things and his service to the
community increases year by year, but certainly it is better for
the accountant and for every other professional man to do only
those things which he is quite sure that he can do. Omniscience
is never a safe attribute for most of us to affect. In this issue
of The Journal of Accountancy appears an able presentation
of the question of inventory verification by M. E. Peloubet. The
paper was read at a meeting of the New York State Society of
Certified Public Accountants and was received with hearty ap
proval by nearly everyone present. From time to time the pro
posal to assume responsibility for inventories arises, but as the
years go by we do not seem to be coming any nearer to the point
where the profession as a whole will adopt the proposed increase
of its responsibilities.

The Economist (London) of October 20,
1928, discussing an address recently
given by Sir Gilbert Garnsey, a promi
nent British accountant, on the limitations of a balance-sheet, de
scribed the balance-sheet as a “species of instantaneous photo
graph of a company’s financial position. The investor looks to it
for information on two essential points—a company’s present
solvency and its future earning power.” The Economist is a
conservative and careful paper but we should hate to believe
that a balance-sheet should indicate the future earning power of a
company. It is admitted that the investor who can read a
balance-sheet—it is said that there are such investors—probably
expects the balance-sheet to afford some indication of probable
future earnings, but his expectation may be ill founded. A
balance-sheet is not anything more than a photograph—it does
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not involve television. Some of the most unfortunate financial
reports have been misleading because someone has attempted to
predict the future. It seems to be admitted that the president of
a company may write a letter to the investment bankers and
express his views of the probable future earning power. If the
investor is willing to accept an ex-parte statement of that kind
he has no one but himself to blame if he falls into error; but the
accountant, it is generally considered, has no business to pro
phesy. He may marshal an array of statistics of past perform
ances and leave it to the reader to infer future probabilities, but
it is not his duty or his right to make definite predictions and cer
tainly a balance-sheet itself can never give information as to future
earning power. We have not the text of the speech by Sir Gil
bert Garnsey to which The Economist refers, but it is quite evident
that the notion that a balance-sheet should prophesy is intended
as a reply to Sir Gilbert’s arguments on the necessary limitations
of a balance-sheet. It must be admitted that if there could be such
a thing as a prophetic balance-sheet it would be an interesting doc
ument—but then, many impossible things would be interesting.

A correspondent in the middle west
recently received a letter from a bond
ing company, addressed in that intimate
and friendly manner which is characteristic of the modern circular
letter—the kind of greeting which one would expect from a long
silent brother. The bonding company which displayed its
affection for our correspondent made a tactical blunder in ad
dressing him, but it afforded an opportunity for the writing of a
letter which has a great deal of interest for all who are concerned
in the prevention of fraud. The letter follows:
Bonding Is Not
a Panacea

Dear Sir: Being secretary of a certain organization in this city there
have been sent to me as such during the past three weeks three circulars
anent the bonding of our employees. The third and last (so far) of these
circulars is enclosed. Of course the bonding company should have been
more careful in selecting its mailing list and should not have included
me and I hope they are more careful in selecting their risks.
The covering letter states that 4,046 claims out of a total of 7,025 paid
during 1926 were caused by dishonest employees. The leaflet enclosed
asserts with entire and candid truth that complicated accounting systems
and frequent audits cannot be depended upon to prevent stealing—
referring rather too pointedly to a specific case—admits that the continued
honesty of an employee cannot be insured and further admits that bonds
are not a solution. It is claimed, however, that they do act as a deterrent
and make good the losses caused by dishonesty.
Now, what are the facts? It is true that audits do not prevent all
defalcations. I know nothing about the case of a “religious organization
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in Richmond, Va.” to which reference is made. The auditors may have
been entirely blameless or entirely at fault. If blameless they have good
grounds for a damage suit; if at fault it is a matter for the local state board
or for the Institute or both. We are all apt to nod at times. But does
anyone in his senses claim that a bond of itself has one thousandth of the
deterrent force as compared with regular or even irregular audits? Wherein
is the deterrent unless where the bond calls for regular audits? Have we
not all heard the employer, when informed that his system of internal
check is weak, say, “Well, he is under bond anyhow"? Is it not a fact
that in such a case, which is far from infrequent, the employer, on account
of the bond, allows temptation to be thrown to the employee? Then
when the employee is weak and falls, in how many instances have we not
seen the bonding company decline payment of the loss on some technicality
of the phraseology which is beyond the comprehension of the average
employer to whom a loss caused by a dishonest employee is a loss and who
did not consider it necessary to consult his attorney as to the meaning of
the word "larceny” as compared with “embezzlement” or some similar
word which to him meant the same thing. Does not the bond frequently
require audits? The leaflet does not go so far, of course, as to claim that
audits are no deterrent but the insinuation is there.
How often do we find an embezzlement when regular audits are made
by competent parties? In comparison, how often are we called in by a
bonding company to trace a loss where no audit has been made? One
of our most valued clients is such a company.
A policy with a bonding company or with a fire insurance company,
while it may make good a loss, does not prevent it and while an audit may
not always prevent, it usually does.
Rates charged by bonding companies while low, because the majority
of people are still honest, could be considerably reduced if the audit
provision were always inserted in the bond and enforced.
Yours faithfully,
E. F.

There is much force in our correspondent’s contention that
the existence of a bond does not prevent dishonesty and in point
of fact may encourage dishonesty. This does not mean that
we should disparage the principle of bonding employees. On the
other hand, the company which bonds all employees who have
any opportunity for embezzlement is merely following the
dictates of experience and common sense, but to rely solely upon
the existence of a bond is absurd.

There is always something modest and
appealing about the advertisements of a
man who believes that he is peculiarly
well fitted to assist the taxpayer in the preparation of tax returns.
Many of the so-called tax experts have a manner of self-praise
which is altogether peculiar, and America is not the only place
where the tax practitioner esteems himself. From an Irish con
temporary we quote the following:

Big Ability and
Tiny Fees

Income Tax
You will lose money if you try to deal with your income tax affairs
without skilled assistance, and probably, what is worse, you will not
realise that you are losing money. The relief sections of the income tax
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acts are complicated; even a careful perusal of the finance acts will be of
little assistance to you. The ordinary allowances, as shown in the ex
planatory leaflets issued by the revenue departments, are easily under
stood, but most tax-payers are entitled to claim the benefit of some special
reliefs for which formal application must be made. It is worse than
useless to pay for advice if your informant is not properly qualified to
give it to you. Obviously the most satisfactory results will be obtained
by consulting a retired inspector of taxes. He has had a special training
in law, accountancy, and in the administration of the income tax code.
I was a member of the British tax inspectorate until I volunteered for
Irish Free State service in 1922. I continued in the Irish service until
1924, when I retired under the treaty provisions. I have had three
years’ experience of income tax agency work, my fees are less than those of
any other income tax agent, and the results I can obtain for you will be
the best.

It should be pointed out that this advertisement appears on
a page devoted to humor, and we are not quite sure whether it is
intended to be a joke or in serious vein, but it bears the impress
of gravity.
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